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Abstract 
 
This study examines one manager-specific investment, the use of derivatives, and the 
corresponding market for corporate control. We find firms with large derivatives positions or 
increases in their unrealized derivatives gains are associated with a significantly lower likelihood 
of being the target of an acquisition. We further find firms with greater magnitude of derivatives 
are associated with weaker boards. Consistent with derivatives being used by managers to protect 
themselves from disciplinary forces, we find the absolute size of firms’ unrealized derivatives 
value is negatively associated with firm value. Finally, firms with decreasing (increasing) 
idiosyncratic risk as well as increasing (decreasing) absolute value of changes in derivatives 
realized gains and losses, exhibit a decreasing (increasing) likelihood of takeovers. In summary, 
the findings are consistent with derivatives being an example of a manager-specific investment 
(Shleifer and Vishny (1989)) that is successful at entrenching management.  
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Corporate Derivatives as a Manager-Specific Investment 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue that by making manager-specific investments managers 
can entrench themselves from various forms of market discipline, such as the market for 
corporate control. When managers invest in projects that are unique to their knowledge set 
replacing them can be costly. The key to the degree of entrenchment is the specificity of the 
investment to the skill or knowledge of the manager. When potential replacement managers 
know little of the investment it is less likely they will be replaced. Corporate takeovers represent 
one market mechanism for replacing poor performing or entrenched managers (Jensen and 
Ruback (1983)), however, when acquiring firms are less knowledgeable of manager-specific 
investment it can increase their potential cost of acquisition. Derivatives represent one type of 
manager-specific investment that can be difficult to evaluate by others and thus creates an 
opportunity for managers to protect themselves from unwanted takeovers and blunt the 
constraining effects of the market for corporate control. The purpose of this study is to examine 
this theory by analyzing this unique manager-specific investment, the use of derivatives, and the 
corresponding threat of a takeover.  
Financial derivatives use is very widespread, even after the financial crisis. According to 
the Bank of International Settlements, the over-the-counter derivatives notional amount cleared 
$700 trillion for the first time in June of 2011 and then again in June 2013. As of December 
2015, the over-the-counter notional amount was close to $500 trillion. Today, a significant 
number of firms routinely manage a variety of market risks with derivatives instruments. Further, 
in a small end-user survey of 334 end-users released in 2015, in response to the question, “How 
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important are derivatives to your firm’s risk management strategy?” 90% responded either 
“Important” or “Very Important”. 
Whether corporations use derivatives for hedging risk or for increasing risk through 
speculation is not clear in the academic literature. For example, Hentschel and Kothari (2001) 
find no evidence of firms with large derivatives programs being associated with greater firm risk, 
which is consistent with corporations using derivatives for hedging purposes. Conversely, Geczy, 
Minton and Schrand (2007) find evidence in survey responses that indicates some firms use their 
derivatives programs for speculation, particularly those with weaker governance. Further 
consistent with the latter view, anecdotal evidence suggests that derivatives have been used in 
many inappropriate ways.1 Therefore, corporate derivatives use is often viewed with suspicion 
(Easterbrook (2002)). The opacity surrounding derivative use makes these instruments very 
managerial specific and therefore very challenging for outsiders to evaluate.   
 For example, in the Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2002 Annual Report, Warren Buffett, 
Chairman and CEO, reports his views on derivatives (along with Charlie Munger, Vice 
Chairman). “We view them [derivatives] as time bombs, both for the parties that deal in them 
and the economic system.” (page 13) Mr. Buffett continues to share his views on derivatives as 
they relate to an insurance company acquisition. 
 “When we purchased Gen Re, it came with General Re Securities, a derivatives 
dealer that Charlie and I didn’t want, judging it to be dangerous. We failed in our 
attempts to sell the operation, however, and are now terminating it. But closing down a 
derivatives business is easier said than done. It will be a great many years before we are 
totally out of this operation (though we reduce our exposure daily). ... [Valuation] 
(e)rrors will usually be honest, reflecting only the human tendency to take an optimistic 
view of one’s commitments. But the parties to derivatives also have enormous incentives 
to cheat in accounting for them. ... I can assure you that the marking errors in the 
derivatives business have not been symmetrical. Almost invariably, they have favored 
either the trader who was eyeing a multi-million dollar bonus or the CEO who wanted to 
                                                
1There	are	many	well-documented	lists	of	derivatives-related	losses.	See,	for	example,	
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_trading_losses	(accessed	on	September	14,	2012).	
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report impressive ‘earning’ (or both). The bonuses were paid, and the CEO profited from 
his options. Only much later did shareholders learn that the reported earnings were a 
sham. ... In our view, however, derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, 
carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.” (pages 13 – 15) 
Interestingly, according to the 2011 annual report, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. had approximately 
$60 billion notional amount of derivatives outstanding nine years after expressing this distaste 
for derivatives. This represents one anecdotal example of the difficulty that large derivative 
positions can present for potential acquirers.  
 In this paper, we explore empirically the relationship between financial derivatives use 
and corporate governance. Specifically, this paper makes four significant contributions to the 
literature. First, we provide empirical evidence on the relationship between financial derivatives 
use and the market for corporate control. For example, firms with larger derivatives positions are 
associated with a lower likelihood of being the target of an acquisition. This is consistent with 
possible acquirers being reluctant to purchase a firm with a potentially large “time bomb” that is 
difficult to value and can be difficult to remove once acquired. Conversely, when firms 
experience a large drop in their derivatives position their likelihood of being targeted increases, 
as this component of uncertainty is reduced for potential buyers of the firm. Results are robust to 
different matched-pairs analysis. 
 Second, we explore the empirical determinants of corporate derivatives use. We 
document that, on average, the absolute value of firms’ derivatives position is positively 
associated with firm size and negatively associated with the percentage of independent directors 
on the board. Thus, large firms with weaker internal monitoring from independent directors are 
more likely to have a larger derivatives position. These findings exacerbate the concerns 
expressed by Buffett because they further suggest that the firms holding a large derivatives 
position are also less constrained by stringent board monitoring. Furthermore, we also find a 
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positive association between the E-Index of a firm and the size of its derivative positions. Thus, 
when firms employ more of the anti-takeover provisions in the E-Index they are also more likely 
to employ larger derivative positions. While the anti-takeover provisions in the E-Index often 
require board approval for adopting, managers can more easily increase their derivative positions 
in an effort to further insulate themselves from the market for corporate control. On the other 
hand, firms with more business segments and thus less likely to be a target of an acquisition, 
have lower derivative positions on average. These results are consistent with large derivative 
positions being an effective deterrent to take-overs.  
 Third, using Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm market value, we find a negative relation 
between firm value and derivatives use. One potential explanation for this finding is that large 
unrealized gains or increases in unrealized gains 2  can reflect managerial hubris, which 
shareholders view with concern, similar to that of Mr. Buffett. Furthermore, if managers have the 
freedom to use derivatives as an avenue to inflate earnings, as suggested in Mr. Buffett’s 
comments, it reflects poorly on the board of directors and can signal greater managerial 
entrenchment. Weak monitoring can have long-term implications for shareholders, which is 
reflected in a lower market valuation of the firm. Conversely, a large decrease in a firm’s 
derivatives position removes this uncertainty for shareholders and thus corresponds to higher 
valuations. Thus, on average, derivatives activity by non-financial firms is associated with lower 
firm valuations consistent with their opacity and potential for being reflective of managerial 
hubris rather than value enhancing tactics. Thus, these findings reveal another avenue by which 
entrenched managers can increase the agency costs of shareholders. The net effect of the greater 
manager entrenchment and ambiguous value of the potentially large derivatives position reveals 
                                                
2 We use two measures of derivatives usage. First, we use the unrealized gain/loss from all of the firm’s outstanding 
derivative transactions. Second, we use the realized derivative gains/losses that are included in the firm’s total 
comprehensive income. 
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evidence that the derivatives position can be one example of manager-specific investment 
described by Shleifer and Vishny (1989) that can serve to entrench managers, increase agency 
costs and ultimately reduce shareholder wealth.  
 Finally, to better separate firms that use derivatives speculatively from those using 
derivatives for valuable hedging, we compare changes in idiosyncratic risk with the absolute 
value of changes in derivatives realized gains and losses as a percentage of sales. We find firms 
with decreasing idiosyncratic risk as well as increasing absolute value of changes in derivatives 
realized gains and losses as a percentage of sales, exhibit a significantly lower likelihood of 
being taken over. That is, firms with low non-compensated risk, perhaps due to managing it with 
financial derivatives, are less likely to be taken over. On the other hand, we find firms with 
increasing idiosyncratic risk and decreasing absolute value of changes in derivatives realized 
gains and losses as a percentage of sales, exhibit an increasing likelihood of takeovers. This 
suggests that these firms may be neglecting to appropriately manage risk or using derivatives for 
speculative purposes. In sum, firms with increasing non-compensated risk that do not appear to 
be managing it with financial derivatives are more likely to be taken over. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 identifies the sample data 
and provides descriptive statistics. Section 3 explores the relationship between firm derivatives 
position and the market for corporate control. Section 4 examines the empirical determinants of 
corporate derivatives use. Section 5 documents the relationship between firm value, measured by 
Tobin’s Q, and derivatives use. Section 6 explores the relationship between firm idiosyncratic 
risk and derivatives use searching for evidence of risk management. Section 7 provides 
sensitivity analysis focused on matched-sample analysis to examine these associations deeper. 
Section 8 provides a summary. 
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2.0 Sample and descriptive statistics 
 The primary data source for our analysis is ExecuComp, which covers the S&P 1500 
firms. More specifically, since our primary data on derivatives are available only after 2000, our 
sample begins in 2001 and extends through 2014. We exclude financial firms, which likely 
engage in greater derivatives activity. We also incorporate board data from the Risk Metrics 
database. Firm accounting information is obtained from Compustat. Merger and Acquisition data 
are from Thomson SDC database.  
 The two primary measures of firm derivatives usage are the unrealized gain/loss on 
derivative transactions and, when available, the realized gain/loss from derivatives transactions 
included in comprehensive income. We scale both of these measures by the firm’s total sales to 
normalize them relative to firm size.  
 Table I reports the summary statistics for these key variables along with other firm and 
board characteristics. Only 45% of the firm-year observations include reported derivatives 
information. Of those reporting, the mean unrealized value is a loss of $11.289 million. 
Although, this is small relative to the sales of the average firm in the sample, it can represent a 
significant derivatives position. A large derivatives position may have very small mark-to-market 
values or annual cash flow implications. The notional amount outstanding would provide more 
information, but it is not available at this time. Even if the notional amount outstanding was 
available for a particular firm, it still is not sufficient information to have a clear understanding 
of the related firm risks. The mean derivatives gain or loss among firms with reporting 
derivatives income is $0.036 million. Even though these values are now disclosed in the firm’s 
financial statements it is difficult, if not impossible, for agents outside the firm to ascertain the 
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actual fair market value of these derivatives contracts and therefore it can be difficult to 
determine whether the derivatives position reflect wise management or executive 
overconfidence.  
 Table I also reveals that firms reporting derivatives positions are significantly different 
from other firms in the sample in several dimensions. Firms reporting derivatives transactions are 
larger in terms of both total assets and total sales. They are also older and have more business 
segments. Thus, firms with derivatives transactions can be more difficult to value given their 
larger size and multiple business segments. In addition, firms with derivatives positions have 
lower levels of Research and Development (R&D) expenditure, consistent with lower levels of 
innovation in these firms. Given the low growth opportunities, one non-hedging motivation for 
firms with derivatives positions is to create value by strategically trading derivatives positions, 
which may or may not be their primary skill set and therefore may not be in the interest of 
shareholders. 
 Firms with derivatives activity exhibit different governance characteristics. They have 
larger boards as well as a greater percentage of independent directors. Thus, there is some 
evidence that firms with derivatives positions have strong oversight, specifically greater board 
independence. On the other hand, we also find other characteristics consistent with weaker 
governance. For example, firms with derivatives activity are more likely to have a busy board, 
defined as a majority of the independent directors having three or more directorships. As busy 
boards are more likely distracted due to multiple commitments, they are less likely to monitor 
diligently (Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and Perry and Peyer (2005)). Additionally, the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) is also more likely to be the chairman of the board of firms with 
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derivatives positions. Thus, management still has a lot of influence over the board through the 
CEO being the chair.  
Finally, while hedging programs can facilitate value creation, derivatives positions are 
typically not intended to directly increase the long-term value of the firm. We find that Tobin’s 
Q, a proxy for firm value, is significantly lower in firms with derivatives positions. Though these 
are only univariate results, the distinct differences in firms with and without derivatives positions 
suggest that derivatives could be used for more than hedging and could potentially be detrimental 
if they reveal an arena for managers to engage in more opaque activities that are difficult to 
monitor and evaluate by someone other than the firm’s managers. 
Insert Table I 
 Table II reports the mean and total value of the unrealized derivatives positions for the 10 
Fama-French defined industries. Interestingly, only two industries have a positive mean 
unrealized derivatives position, Consumer Durables and Wholesale/Retail. In absolute terms, 
Manufacturing, Utilities and Other (which includes transportation and finance), have the largest 
value in unrealized derivatives positions. These industries also likely have reasons to hedge for 
fluctuations in fuel and energy prices. 
Insert Table II 
 
3.0 Derivatives positions and the market for corporate control 
 The use of derivatives to hedge against risk exposure can be valuable for managers. 
Large derivative unrealized gains and losses may be offsetting large firm-related losses and 
gains. Alternatively, large unrealized gains or losses may reflect excessive use of derivatives, 
perhaps beyond that required for hedging purposes and can therefore provide additional insight 
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into managerial skill. Excessive derivatives use can thus represent managerial hubris, which is of 
interest to shareholders. Large unrealized gains can reflect managers using greater knowledge of 
their business to create value through derivatives trading. Alternatively, large losses can reflect 
manager’s misunderstanding of the markets in which they operate and trade, revealing lower 
skill levels.  
 Although the value of the underlying position is difficult to determine, the reported gains 
and losses provide insight into their effectiveness and another element of managerial skill. If 
large derivatives gains and losses are reflective of managerial talent and their degree of 
alignment with shareholders, they are likely important determinants in whether the firm is the 
target of an acquisition. The external market for corporate control is an important disciplinary 
force acting on managers. If large derivatives losses reflect poor manager skills they are expected 
to be associated with a greater likelihood of the firm being the target of an acquisition. 
Conversely, large derivatives gains are likely to be associated with a lower likelihood of the firm 
being the target of an acquisition. Large gains can reduce the likelihood of a firm being a target 
for two reasons. First, successful derivatives strategies can reflect greater managerial skill that 
reduces the attractiveness as a target due to poor or entrenched management (Jensen and Ruback 
(1983)). Second, large derivatives positions are a source of unknown potential liability that can 
deter potential acquirers due to hidden costs (see Buffett’s comments above) and can be difficult 
to value or unwind by those other than the managers who established them (Shleifer and Vishny 
(1989)).  
After separating firms into terciles based upon a measure of their derivative use, we 
examine the proportion of firms that are targeted in each tercile. We find that 14.16 percent of 
firms with the highest derivative use are targeted, 16.98 percent are targeted from the middle 
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tercile, and 18.09 percent of the lowest derivative use firms are targeted. The difference in 
proportions between the top and bottom tercile is statistically significant (p<0.01). Initial 
evidence is consistent with high derivative use firms being less attractive targets of an 
acquisition.  
Table III examines this hypothesis by examining the likelihood of firms being the target 
of an acquisition during our sample period after controlling for other firm characteristics that are 
associated with the likelihood of a firm being an acquisition target. The dependent variable is one 
if the firm is the target of an acquisition in a given year and zero otherwise. All models include 
robust standard errors clustered by firm to account for serial correlation. The key explanatory 
variables are the derivatives unrealized gains (losses) and the derivatives income gains (losses) 
scaled by total sales and industry adjusted with the 49 Fama-French industry median. We use the 
industry adjusted measure to account for the varying use of derivatives across industries.  
  In model 1 the coefficient estimate on the unrealized derivatives value scaled by total 
sales is negative and significant. In model 2, we use the first difference of the derivatives 
unrealized gains and losses and find a similar result. The results in models 1 and 2 indicate that 
large derivatives gains or increases in derivatives gains are associated with a lower likelihood of 
the firm being the target of an acquisition in the year. Conversely, firms experiencing derivatives 
losses are associated with a greater likelihood of being the target of an acquisition. These 
findings are consistent with derivatives being an important component in determining a firm’s 
attractiveness in the market for corporate control.  
 In model 3 we consider the realized derivatives income measure of derivatives activity 
and find similar results. When firm management experiences a gain recorded as derivatives 
income they are less likely to be targeted, but when they experience a loss recorded as 
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derivatives loss they are more likely to be targeted particularly if the derivatives loss was not 
related to hedging. The other controls reveal that firms with recent poor stock performance, low 
leverage, and better operating performance are more likely to be the target of an acquisition. 
Also, greater merger and acquisition (M&A) activity within the industry increases the likelihood 
that a firm is targeted.  
If derivatives positions represent a significant component of firm value then potential 
bidders may have reason to think twice about making an acquisition attempt. First, it can be 
difficult to truly value the derivatives positions without knowing the details of the contracts. 
Second, derivatives positions can dramatically change in value based on the contract and the 
performance of the underlying assets. Thus, potential bidders must evaluate the risk associated 
with purchasing a firm that could be worth significantly less once the derivatives positions are 
unwound. This uncertainty associated with excessive derivatives positions can deter many 
potential buyers. To further examine this issue, we study the likelihood of the acquisition bids for 
targeted firms being subsequently withdrawn. Due diligence is a critical part of any M&A 
transaction. Once a bidder initiates a non-hostile acquisition they can work with the target firm to 
negotiate a final bid and better evaluate the firm before consummating the merger. It is possible 
that during this period the acquiring firm may obtain information that leads it to reevaluate its 
bid. If the information is negative, it may choose to withdraw the bid.  
Model 4 reports results of a logit regression on the sample of firms targeted by a bidder. 
It examines the likelihood that the bidding firm withdraws its bid. The coefficient estimate on the 
change in unrealized derivatives value is positive and significant. This indicates that target firms 
with large derivatives positions are more likely to have acquisition attempts withdrawn once they 
have been targeted. One potential reason for a bidder to withdraw their bid is that they realize the 
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difficulty in valuing the derivatives position. Additionally, increased uncertainty and the 
potential for large losses could make it too costly for them to pursue the acquisition. Finally, lack 
of managerial expertise to continue or unwind the derivatives position could also be a deterrent. 
Interestingly, we also included an indicator variable equal to one if the acquiring firm had 
previous experience using derivatives. For example, if the acquiring firm is already engaged in 
derivative use, they are less likely to be deterred from completing the acquisition due to 
inexperience with derivatives. As expected we find that experience with derivatives decreases 
the likelihood the acquirer withdraws its takeover bid. 
As described in more detail below, Bebchuk, Cohen and Farrell (2009) develop an 
entrenchment index (E-Index) comprised of anti-takeover provisions. Given that anti-takeover 
provisions also are possibly correlated with the size of a firm’s derivative position and the 
prospect of a takeover, we include the E-Index as a control variable in all four regressions in 
Table 3. Data to calculate the E-Index is available for approximately 75 percent of the 
observations. We present results in Panel B for the observations that have data to calculate the E-
Index. Results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar after including it as a control variable.   
Insert Table III 
In untabulated analysis, we separate the sample into pre- and post- financial crisis and 
examine the periods separately. Results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar for all four 
models with the following exceptions. In model 2 of the pre-crisis period (2001-2005), the 
coefficient estimate on the derivatives measure is negative but not significant (p = 0.113). In 
model 1 of the post-crisis period (2010-2014) the coefficient estimate on the derivatives measure 
is negative but not significant (p = 0.645).  
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 In summary, firms with large positive derivatives positions are less likely to be targeted 
in general, but if they are targeted, the uncertainty associated with the value of their derivatives 
positions makes it more likely that the acquisition is subsequently withdrawn. The findings have 
important implications for analysis of merger and acquisition decisions. While the findings thus 
far demonstrate that large derivatives positions can deter takeover attempts, it is not clear 
whether this deterrence is due to superior managerial skills (unrelated to derivatives) increasing 
firm value and thus deterring discipline from the market for corporate control. Alternatively, the 
deterrence could be aversion to acquiring firm risk associated with unknown stakes in large 
derivatives positions. If the latter is the case, large derivatives positions could indeed represent 
an important manager-specific investment that can therefore reflect entrenched managers. 
Moreover, if this is the case then the opacity of their nature makes the market for corporate 
control less effective in constraining managerial entrenchment. The next two sections address 
these two possibilities further. 
 
4.0 Determinants of derivatives positions 
 To further examine the characteristics of firms with derivatives positions, we analyze the 
factors associated with the absolute value of the derivatives position. Whether the firm reports 
unrealized gains or losses is not critical as we are interested in the information revealed in the 
industry adjusted size of the positions reported. Table IV reports results of OLS regressions of 
the firm’s derivatives use on firm characteristics and/or the strength of internal monitoring of 
management. The dependent variable is the absolute value of the firms unrealized derivatives 
gains (losses) in model 1 and realized gains (losses) in model 2. All models include industry 
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fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by firm. Results are consistent in both models 
and thus we discuss them simultaneously. 
 Larger firms are associated with larger derivatives positions. This is perhaps due to the 
inherent barriers to derivatives use, such as qualified accounting staff, good credit rating, and 
significant collateral requirements. Thus, not all firms have the internal expertise for their 
managers’ to engage in large-scale derivatives trading. Boards with fewer independent directors 
are associated with larger derivatives positions. Thus, stronger internal monitoring by the board 
of directors is associated with a significantly smaller magnitude of the firm’s derivatives 
positions. This is consistent with tighter internal constraints on managers to limit their use of 
derivatives and with the survey results in Geczy, Minton and Schrand (2007) who find that firms 
indicating speculative motives for their derivatives also report a greater use of internal controls to 
monitor trading activity. Furthermore, because larger firms provide greater reputation benefits 
for directors (Masulis and Mobbs (2014)), these directors are likely more diligent in their 
monitoring of management and less willing to support activities or practices that are difficult to 
monitor, such as large derivatives positions.  
 Board size and CEO/Chair duality are not significantly related to the size of the firm’s 
derivatives positions. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) construct an entrenchment index (E-
Index) comprised of the six strongest anti-takeover provisions from the Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003) Governance Index, which are classified boards, golden parachutes, limitations on 
bylaw and charter amendments, supermajority voting and poison pills. We document that the E-
Index is positively associated with derivatives positions, consistent with derivatives use 
associated with entrenchment behavior. One important difference between the use of derivatives 
for takeover deterrence and these provisions is that these provisions often require board approval, 
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whereas managers can alter their derivative positions perhaps without the board even knowing. 
Thus, it is potentially a more obscure method of deterring unwanted takeovers. 
We also find evidence that firms with greater leverage are associated with greater 
absolute derivatives positions. This is consistent with the idea that the need for quality financial 
risk management is directly related to leverage. Finally, we find evidence that firms with more 
business segments are negatively associated with derivatives positions. This is consistent with 
these firms already being diversified through their multiple business segments and thus having 
less of a need to hedge risks through the use of derivatives.  
Insert Table IV 
Pre- and post-crisis analysis yields similar results. Larger firms are associated with larger 
derivatives positions in both subperiods and the measure is significant. Differences from the 
overall sample are as follows. Post-crisis, boards with fewer independent directors are associated 
with larger derivatives positions, but it is not significant. Pre-crisis, the E-Index is positively 
associated with derivatives positions, but is also not significant. 
The use of derivatives to hedge risk exposures should be particularly valuable if the risk 
is idiosyncratic. That is, shareholders will benefit when managers reduce non-compensated, 
unsystematic risk to shareholders. For example, hedging idiosyncratic risk can reduce costs 
associated with financial distress. By reducing the volatility of cash flows the firm can decrease 
its expected bankruptcy costs as well as its probability of distress, which leads to reduced costs 
of default as firms are less likely to trigger debt covenants. This is especially the case for firms 
with higher levels of debt. Thus higher leveraged firms can benefit more from hedging, 
consistent with results in Table IV. Hedging idiosyncratic risk can also add value by reducing the 
firm’s required rate of return. 
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 In summary, the evidence in Table IV is consistent with certain firm characteristics being 
associated with larger derivatives positions. One interesting finding, however, is the link between 
board monitoring, as measured by the percentage of independent directors, and the magnitude of 
the firm’s derivatives positions. Thus, there is evidence of an association between the firm’s 
derivatives practices and its governance. If greater use of derivatives is associated with weaker 
governance, whether due to reduced discipline from the market for corporate control or from 
weaker internal monitoring, there should be valuation implications for shareholders. 
 
5.0 Firm value 
 The evidence thus far suggests that firms with larger derivatives positions are associated 
with weaker monitoring, which can result in entrenched managers and derivatives positions that 
are difficult to value. Furthermore, on average, these difficult-to-value derivatives positions are 
associated with unrealized losses rather than gains. Do these positions reflect greater managerial 
hubris? 
 We attempt to provide insight into this question by examining correlations with 
derivatives positions and firm value. We measure firm value by the natural logarithm of an 
approximation of Tobin’s Q, which is measured as total book assets minus book equity plus the 
market value of equity all scaled by total book assets. We also include controls used in other 
similar studies (for example, Coles Daniel and Naveen (2008), Anderson and Reeb (2003), Fich 
and Shivdasani (2006), and Masulis and Mobbs (2011)). All models also include robust standard 
errors clustered by firm.  
 Table V Model 1 reveals a negative and significant relation between the industry adjusted 
derivatives positions and Tobin’s Q. Model 2 reveals a negative and insignificant relation 
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between the change in industry adjusted unrealized derivatives value and Tobin’s Q. These 
results are consistent with greater derivatives positions or increases in derivatives positions being 
reflective of managerial hubris, which leads to lower firm value. Conversely, unrealized losses or 
decreases in unrealized losses are associated with increases in firm value. This is consistent with 
unrealized losses reflecting partial hedging. For example, a firm that experiences losses from 
their derivatives positions, but is only 40 percent hedged, will have experienced significant gains 
that were not completely offset. Model 3 documents insignificant results when using the 
derivatives income measure while Model 4 documents marginal significance consistent with the 
result in Model 1. The net effect of the greater manager entrenchment and ambiguous value of 
the potentially large positions reveals some evidence that these positions are associated with 
lower firm value and reduced shareholder wealth. Thus, this evidence suggests the previous 
findings of reduced exposure to discipline from the market for corporate control is more likely 
due to reluctance of potential acquirers due to the uncertainty of the large derivatives positions 
rather than skilled risk management. 
Insert Table V 
 In unreported analysis, we also examined the relationship between the firm’s derivatives 
position and CEO compensation. We find no evidence of a significant association, which suggest 
CEOs are not necessarily using derivatives trading to bolster earnings. This does not mean, 
however, that the managers do not receive other benefits from their derivatives practices. 
Specifically, the reduced monitoring from the external market and from their boards suggests 
these managers face fewer constraints and have the potential to extract other pecuniary benefits 
from the firm. One such benefit is greater job security through the reduced threat of losing their 
job by being acquired by another firm. 
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 Pre-crisis subperiod results are the same sign and stronger significance at traditional 
levels for the derivatives coefficients in Models 1, 2 and 3. Model 4 derivatives coefficient is 
negative, but not significant. Post-crisis subperiod results have a positive sign for the derivatives 
coefficients, but are not significant. Thus, perhaps post-crisis derivatives use is not having the 
same negative impact on firm value. 
 Although the evidence in this section suggests lower firm values result from greater 
derivatives use, perhaps there remains a risk management motivation. We explore this possibility 
next. 
 
6.0 Risk Management 
 The evidence presented above suggests that the proportion of firms that are targeted 
decreases with increased derivatives use. A firm with decreasing derivative activity is, all else 
equal, easier to evaluate as a target. In Table III, we document multivariate evidence consistent 
with this finding. However, up to this point, we have treated derivative use as homogenous. We 
recognize that derivatives can be used for either hedging or speculative purposes. As discussed 
above, proper hedging would reduce firm risk and in particular, idiosyncratic risk. One direct 
benefit would be lower financial distress costs. Reductions of idiosyncratic risk also may create 
market value through reduced taxes. For example, increasing marginal tax rates and limits on the 
use of tax-loss carryforwards impose higher effective rates of taxation on higher levels of 
reported earnings and provide lower tax rebates on larger losses. Because of the convexity of the 
tax code, firms can increase value by reducing fluctuations in taxable income and therefore 
increasing cash flow over time. 
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 While derivatives use may represent a manager-specific investment, we have also shown 
evidence that acquiring firms with some level of derivative expertise, are less likely to withdraw 
takeover bids. Thus, acquiring firms with derivative expertise may seek to add firm value 
through implementing improved hedging strategies.  
 For example, a firm with derivative use and increasing idiosyncratic risk suggests that 
management is either poorly skilled at derivative use or using derivatives to deter any unwanted 
takeover attempts, thus entrenching themselves at shareholders’ expense. These firms could be 
sought after as takeover targets as new skilled managers could implement quality derivatives-
based risk management strategies to lower the idiosyncratic risk and hence raise the value of the 
target firm.  
On the other hand, a firm with increasing derivatives use and concurrent decreasing 
idiosyncratic risk is consistent with management implementing an appropriate hedging strategy. 
These firms are the least likely to be targeted as even acquirers with derivatives expertise may 
not be able to add firm value by implementing a different hedging strategy. Thus, in this section, 
we seek to examine evidence related to derivatives use and idiosyncratic risk.    
 We explore the relationship between changes in idiosyncratic risk and the absolute value 
of changes in derivatives realized gains and losses as a percentage of sales. We calculate 
idiosyncratic risk by regressing the firm’s weekly returns on the weekly Fama-French three-
factor model for each individual firm year. The idiosyncratic risk is defined as the square root of 
the unexplained variance (Hou and Moskowitz (2005); Park and Vrettos (2015)). Finally, the 
observations were split into terciles by the change in idiosyncratic risk and by the absolute value 
of the change in realized derivative gains and losses.  The middle tercile of both measures was 
eliminated.  Thus, we have with a 2 by 2 matrix of firms from the highest of lowest terciles of 
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changes in idiosyncratic risk and derivative use, i.e. the highest (lowest) tercile of idiosyncratic 
risk represents are firm with the largest increases (decreases) in risk and the highest (lowest) 
tercile of derivative use represents the largest (smallest) change in derivatives position.   
 Table VI reports the results. We expect a firm is more likely to be targeted if they 
experienced the largest increase in idiosyncratic risk and the smallest change in derivative use as 
this provides an opportunity of incoming management to initiate a proper hedging strategy and 
create firm value (19.6 percent of the firms in this quadrant were targeted).  Further, management 
is likely speculating if they experienced the largest increase in both idiosyncratic risk and 
derivative use (13.6 percent targeted). This quadrant represents firms that are likely using 
derivatives for speculation and for which derivative use is an effective takeover deterrent. 
Management is likely hedging if they experienced the largest decrease in idiosyncratic risk and 
the largest change in derivative use (12.2 percent targeted). Relative to other quadrants, incoming 
management would least likely be able to increase firm value through hedging for firms in this 
quadrant.  Firms in the two quadrants in the top row, which represents greater derivative use, are 
both significantly less likely to experience a takeover compared to firms in the bottom two 
quadrants that exhibit a much lower degree of derivative use. Among these high-derivative use 
firms there is no significant difference in the fraction of firms targeted. Firms exhibiting the 
largest decreases in risk and the smallest change in derivatives use firms may be targeted for 
other reasons (15.5 percent targeted). For example, these firms may be attractive for those 
seeking to increase the firm’s leverage due to the decline in riskiness and apparent lower use of 
derivatives.  
 The p-values given are a test of the difference in the proportions of firms targeted 
between the rows and columns.  Table VI illustrates the data in two ways, where the proportions 
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are highlighted that go with the respective p-values listed. As expected, the proportion of firms 
targeted (19.6 percent) is statistically highest in the quadrant that provides incoming 
management with the greatest opportunity to create value by reducing firm-specific risk through 
proper hedging.3 Furthermore, we find that lowest takeover frequencies occur in firms with the 
higher level of derivative usage. As reported in the columns surrounded in red, fewer takeover 
attempts occur, whether change in risk is high or low, when derivative use increases. This is 
consistent with our findings in Table III and further suggests that managers’ use of derivative 
instruments can success. These results suggest that the use of derivatives, in addition to deterring 
takeover, or perhaps because of it, can affect firm value. For example, firms in the top left 
quadrant make great use of derivatives and yet their firm risk is increasing. This suggests that 
firm managers are either (a) of poor quality and should be replace or are (b) using hedging for 
speculative purposes and perhaps to intentionally deter unwanted takeovers and thereby further 
entrenching themselves. In either case, the managers are destroying value for shareholders. They 
are either poorly skilled or they are entrenched. To examine this further, we compute the mean 
firm Tobin’s Q for each quadrant. We report these results in Panel B. Indeed, firms in the top left 
quadrant (high derivative use and high firm risk) exhibit significantly lower value. Interestingly, 
the firms with the highest mean Tobin’s Q are in the top right quadrant (high derivative use and 
lower firm risk), which contains firms that are most likely using derivatives correctly for hedging 
purposes and thus increasing firm value. Finally, it is also possible that undervalued firms are 
attractive to potential purchasers. If undervalued firms are driving results in Table VI (separate 
from derivative strategy), we would expect to observe the lowest values of Tobin’s Q within the 
                                                
3	Similar patterns exist when measuring the change in derivative use as the absolute value of the change in the 
derivatives unrealized gains and losses.	
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quadrant where the highest percentage of firms are targeted. We fail to observe such a pattern, 
which suggests this is not driving our takeover results.  
Insert Table VI 
 Though not reported here, we also separated firms based upon the change in total risk as 
opposed to idiosyncratic risk. The sign and significance of proportional differences are similar 
with the following exception. The difference between increases and decreases in total risk for the 
largest changes in derivatives measure is 4.4 percent (p<0.01) compared with 1.4 percent 
(p=0.341) for idiosyncratic risk. We also separated firms based on the change in systematic risk. 
Not surprisingly, there were no significant differences noted between the increasing and 
decreasing risk columns for either derivative position as firms are unlikely to hedge systematic 
risk. However, we continue to note statistically lower likelihood of being targeted for firms with 
increased derivatives use for both increases and decreases in systematic risk. Thus, regardless of 
how risk is measured, higher changes in derivatives use result in lower likelihood of being 
targeted. 
 For both pre- and post-crisis, when idiosyncratic risk is increasing, a lower proportion of 
firms are targeted when they have the largest change in derivative use (p<0.01). This difference, 
however, is the only significantly different paired comparison post-crisis—the other three are 
insignificant. Pre-crisis, when the change in derivatives is smallest, there is a mildly significant 
higher proportion of targeted firms with increasing idiosyncratic risk (p<0.10). Thus, regardless 
of which period idiosyncratic risk is measured, larger changes in derivatives use results in a 
lower likelihood of being targeted when idiosyncratic risk is high. 
 
7.0 Sensitivity Analysis 
24	
	
Results above are consistent with derivatives being used as a tool to prevent being 
targeted. However, it is possible that other contemporaneously determined factors impact the 
market for corporate control. As such, we conduct a matched-sample analysis to examine the 
association deeper. Rather than match on the outcome variable (being targeted), researchers 
suggest a superior econometric approach would be to match on the variable of interest 
(derivatives usage) and then examine differences in the frequency of being targeted (Armstrong, 
Jagolinzer and Larcker 2010, Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal and Taylor 2013; Jayaraman and 
Milbourn 2015).  
As such, we follow Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal and Taylor (2013) and Jayaraman 
and Milbourn (2015) and estimate a propensity score model for the probability that the company 
has high derivatives usage4 (using the median as the cutoff), conditional on factors that 
contribute to derivatives use (independent variables from Table IV). We then identify matched 
pairs with the smallest propensity score differences and identify the “treatment” firm as the firm 
with the higher observed derivatives use; the “control” firm is firm with the lower observed 
derivatives use. First, in Panel A of Table VII, we examine the covariate balance by examining 
the means and medians of the variables used to estimate the propensity score. Only one of the 
variables used in the propensity demonstrates a marginal significant difference in mean or 
median (Leverage,p=0.083), while the remaining differences are not significant. We also note a 
significant difference in derivatives use (p-value=0.000). Thus, we have matched pairs with the 
closest likelihood to have high derivatives use while demonstrating a significant difference in the 
actual observed derivatives use. In this manner, Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal and Taylor 
                                                
4 Consistent with Table IV, derivatives use is defined as the absolute value of the unrealized gain/loss on derivative 
transactions. 
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(2013) note this suggests that any variation in being targeted is likely attributable to differences 
in derivatives use rather than differences in other firm characteristics.   
In Panel B of Table VIII, we examine the difference in the probability of being targeted 
between the high- and low-derivative use firms. The average low-derivative use firm is targeted 
approximately eighteen percent less often than a similar firm that has high-derivative use (0.13 
compared to 0.11, p-value=0.002). In untabulated results, we repeat this analysis using the 
realized gain/loss from derivatives transactions included in comprehensive income as the 
measure of derivatives use instead of the unrealized gain/loss. Results are quantitatively and 
qualitatively similar. The average low-derivative use firm is targeted approximately twenty-
seven percent less often than a similar firm that has high-derivative use (0.14 compared to 0.11, 
p-value=0.000). These matched-pair results confirm the association between the use of 
derivatives and the market for corporate control. 
In untabulated analysis, we also performed a different econometric approach. We 
matched a targeted firm to a control firm based on several covariates. The resulting matched 
pairs demonstrated no statistical difference among the covariates. Using a dichotomous variable 
for the treatment and control firms as the dependent variable and the independent variables from 
Table III, we estimate a conditional logistic regression, which accounts for the fact that the pairs 
were matched on the dependent variable. Results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to 
Table III. It is informative that results are not sensitive to the econometric matching method 
used. 
Insert Table VII 
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8.0 Conclusion 
 Unrealized derivatives gains or losses are often small relative to total firm sales, however, 
they can often only be the tip of a very large “iceberg.” The notional amount outstanding of a 
firm’s derivatives positions, in addition to having the potential to be extremely large, is very 
difficult to understand and value. This large hidden value creates an advantage for incumbent 
managers and represents an important type of manager-specific investment that can create job 
security for the current managers. The market for corporate control is an important governance 
mechanism that serves to constrain managerial entrenchment by providing a threat of removal. 
When managers enter in large derivatives positions, however, it can dramatically increase the 
uncertainty and cost incurred by another firm considering acquiring it. If the acquiring managers 
are uncertain about the value of the derivatives positions they are less likely to make an 
acquisition attempt.  
 Consistent with this conjecture, we find that large unrealized derivatives gains are 
associated with a significantly lower likelihood of the firm being the target of an acquisition. We 
also conduct further tests to determine whether the reduced likelihood of being a target is due to 
the target firms’ managers being more skilled or if it is more consistent with entrenchment. After 
all, large unrealized gains could be due to prudent derivatives trading, which reflect greater 
managerial skill. We find two pieces of evidence that is supportive of the entrenchment 
explanation rather than higher managerial skill. Specifically, we find that firms with higher 
derivatives positions are associated with lower levels of board independence, which suggests 
weaker internal monitoring. We also find evidence of a negative association between a firm’s 
unrealized derivatives gains and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. Both of these negative 
associations suggest that, on average, greater derivative use is an example of an important type 
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of manager-specific investment that can be effective in entrenching managers. Finally, we 
document that firms with increasing absolute value of derivatives realized gains and losses are 
much less likely to be a takeover target. Conversely, when firms exhibit decreasing derivative 
usage, but increasing risk, which suggest ineffective use of derivatives for hedging they are more 
likely to be the target of an acquisition. In summary, our findings reveal that corporate derivative 
use can reveal important insights for shareholders into managerial incentives and skills.   
28	
	
References: 
 
Anderson, R., and D. Reeb, 2003, “Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance:  
Evidence from the S&P 500,” Journal of Finance 58, 1301-1328. 
 
Armstrong, C., A. Jagolinzer, and D. Larcker, 2010, “Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives 
and Accounting Irregularities,” Journal of Accounting Research, 48, 225-271.  
 
Armstrong, C., D. Larcker, G. Ormazabal, and D. Taylor, 2013, “The Relation between Equity 
Incentives and Misreporting: The Role of Risk-Taking Incentives,” Journal of Financial 
Economics 109, 327-350. 
 
Bebchuk, L.; A. Cohen; and A. Ferrell, 2009, "What Matters in Corporate Governance?" Review 
of Financial Studies 22, 783–827. 
 
Coles, J.; N. Daniel; and L. Naveen, 2008, “Boards:  Does one size fit all?” Journal of Financial 
Economics 87, 329-356. 
 
Easterbrook, F. H., 2002, “Derivative Securities and Corporate Governance,” The University of 
Chicago Law Review 69, 733-747. 
 
Fich, E., and A. Shivdasani, 2006, “Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?” Journal of Finance 
61, 689-724. 
 
Geczy, C. C.; B. A. Minton; and C. M. Schrand, 2007, “Taking a View: Corporate speculation, 
governance and compensation,” Journal of Finance 62, 2405-2444. 
 
Gompers, P.; J. Ishii; and A. Metrick, 2003, "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices." 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 107–156. 
 
Hentschel, L., and S. P. Kothari, 2001, “Are Corporations Reducing or Taking Risks with 
Derivatives?” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 36, 93-118. 
 
Hou, K., and T. Moskowitz, 2005, “Market Frictions, Price Delay, and the Cross-Section of 
Expected Returns”, Review of Financial Studies 18, 981-1020. 
 
Jayaraman, S., and T. Milbourn, 2015, “CEO Equity Incentives and Financial Misreporting: The 
Role of Auditor Expertise,” The Accounting Review 90, 321-350. 
 
Jensen, M., and R. Ruback, 1983, “The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence,” 
Journal of Financial Economics 11, 5-50. 
  
Masulis, R., and S. Mobbs, 2011, “Are All Inside Directors the Same? Evidence from the 
External Directorship Market” Journal of Finance 66, 823-872. 
 
29	
	
Masulis, R., and S. Mobbs, 2014, “Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors 
spend their limited time and energy?,” Journal of Financial Economics 111, 406-429. 
 
Park, H., and D. Vrettos, 2015, “The Moderating Effect of Relative Performance Evaluation on 
the Risk Incentive Properties of Executives’ Equity Portfolios” Journal of Accounting Research 
53, 1055-1108. 
 
Perry, T., and U. Peyer, 2005, “Board Seat Accumulation by Executives: A Shareholder’s 
Perspective.” Journal of Finance 60, 2083-2123. 
 
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny, 1989, “Management Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-Specific 
Investments” Journal of Financial Economics 25, 123-139. 
 
Wilcoxon, F., 1945, “Individual Comparisons by Ranking Methods” Biometrics Bulletin 1, 80-
83. 
 
30	
	
Table I. Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm	Characteristics N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Derivatives	Unrealized 17,347 -5.076 0.000 9,548 0.000 0.000 7,799 -11.289 -0.719
Derivative	Gains/Loss 13,399 0.030 0.000 7,286 0.000 0.000 6,113 0.036 0.023
Derivatives	Unrealized	/	Sales 17,347 -0.001 0.000 9,548 0.000 0.000 7,799 -0.001 0.000
Derivative	Gains/Loss	/	Sales 13,399 0.000 0.000 7,286 0.000 0.000 6,113 0.000 0.000
Assets 17,347 7,073.987 1,495.370 9,548 3,235.370 798.229 7,799 11,773.450 3,160.926 -8,538.080 *** -2,362.698 ***
Sales 17,347 6,002.099 1,389.530 9,548 3,429.830 802.916 7,799 9,151.224 2,761.000 -5,721.394 *** -1,958.085 ***
R&D/Assets 17,347 0.034 0.002 9,548 0.042 0.002 7,799 0.023 0.002 0.020 *** 0.000 ***
Firm	Age 17,347 24.823 19.000 9,548 20.838 17.000 7,799 29.701 24.000 -8.863 *** -7.000 ***
Number	of	Business	Segments 14,583 2.718 2.000 7,721 2.443 1.000 6,862 3.029 3.000 -0.586 *** -2.000 ***
Volatility 17,076 0.123 0.107 9,366 0.136 0.119 7,710 0.107 0.095 0.029 *** 0.024 ***
Board	Size 14,583 9.050 9.000 7,721 8.453 8.000 6,862 9.725 10.000 -1.272 *** -2.000 ***
Percent	Independent 14,583 75.406 77.778 7,721 73.654 75.000 6,862 77.386 80.000 -3.732 *** -5.000 ***
Busy	Board 14,583 0.052 0.000 7,721 0.040 0.000 6,862 0.066 0.000 -0.026 *** 0.000 ***
CEO	Chair 14,583 0.549 1.000 7,721 0.508 1.000 6,862 0.595 1.000 -0.087 *** 0.000 ***
ROA 17,347 0.143 0.136 9,548 0.135 0.133 7,799 0.152 0.138 -0.016 -0.006 ***
Q 17,313 1.979 1.601 9,529 2.110 1.680 7,784 1.818 1.525 0.292 *** 0.155 ***
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
All	Firms No	Derivatives Derivatives Difference
This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample firms, excluding financial firms. The sample period is from years 2001 to 2006. Derivatives Unrealized is 
the balance sheet item, Compustat item AOCIDERGL – accumulated other comprehensive income – derivatives unrealized gains/loss. Derivative Gains/Loss is 
the income statement item, Compustat item CIDERGL – comprehensive income – derivatives gains/losses. Both are in $millions. Firm total sales, total assets, 
research and development expenditures (R&D) and the number of business segments are from Compustat. Firm Age is determined from the first year the firm 
occurs in the CRSP database. Volatility is the past standard deviation of the prior thirty-six monthly stock returns, which are obtained from CRSP. All board 
data are from Risk Metrics database. Board size is the number of directors on the board. Percent Independent is the percentage of board members who are not 
employees of the firm or related to firm managers and have no affiliation with the firm. Busy Board is an indicator variable that equals one if more than 50% of 
the independent directors on the board have 3 or more directorships. CEO Chair is an indicator that equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 
zero otherwise. ROA is EBITDA scaled by total assets. Q is the market to book approximation of Tobin’s Q, which is measured as total book assets minus book 
equity plus the market value of equity all scaled by total book assets. T-test is used to test for difference in the means and the difference in medians are tested 
using the Wilcoxon (1945) signed rank test. 
31	
	
 
 
Table II. Fama-French 10 Industry Mean and Total Derivatives Unrealized 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fama-French	10	Industry	Mean	and	Total	Derivatives	Unrealized
Mean Total
Derivatives Derivatives
Fama	French	10	Industry	Definitions Unrealized Unrealized
1.	Consumer	NonDurables	--	Food	Tobacco,	Textiles,	Apparel,	Leather,	Toys -3.761 -4,062.134
2.	Consumer	Durable	--	Cars,	TVs,	Furniture,	Household	Appliances 3.769 1,749.032
3.	Manufacturing	--	Machinery,	Trucks,	Planes,	Chemicals,	Off.	Furniture,	Paper -10.543 -29,140.930
4.	Energy,	Oil,	Gas,	and	Coal	Extraction	and	Products -11.750 -9,023.965
5.	HiTech	Business	Equipment	--	Computers,	Software,	and	Electronic	Equipment -1.119 -3,544.281
6.	Telephone	and	Television	Transmission -9.375 -2,624.953
7.	Wholesale,	Retail,	and	Some	Services	(Laundries,	Repair	Shops) 0.182 375.186
8.	Healthcare,	Medical	Equipment,	and	Drugs -6.090 -8,489.281
9.	Utilities -27.112 -11,386.990
10.	Other	--	Mines,	Contr.	Bld	Mt.,	Trans.,	Hotels,	Bus.	Serv.,	Entertainment,	Finance -11.836 -22,642.070
This table reports the mean and total derivatives unrealized for each of the 10 Fama-French defined industry definitions for 
firms reporting derivative gains or losses. Financial firms are included in industry 10. 
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Table III. Acquisition Target 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Panel A 
 
This table reports results of logit regressions on the likelihood of the firm being a target of an acquisition attempt during the sample 
period. The dependent variable in models 1 through 3 equals one if the firm is the target of an acquisition attempt during the year. 
Model 4 examines the subsample of firms that are the target of an acquisition attempt and the dependent variable equals one if the 
acquisition attempt was withdrawn and zero otherwise. Derivatives Unrealized Gains (Losses)/Sales is industry adjusted based on the 
median value for the Fama-French 49 Industry. FD indicates the first-difference of the variable. Annual stock return is the monthly 
compounded return for the fiscal year from CRSP. Leverage is the book value of long-term debt plus current liabilities scaled by total 
book assets from Compustat. Cash holdings is cash plus marketable securities scaled by total assets. CEO ownership is the percentage 
of shares outstanding held by the CEO from Execucomp.  Industry M&A Activity is the number of mergers or acquisitions in the 
Fama-French 49 industry classification industry. All M&A data are from Thomson’s SDC database. Financial firms are excluded. All 
models incorporate robust standard errors and firm clustering. The corresponding p-values are reported beneath each coefficient 
estimate. 
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Table III. Acquisition Target 
Panel B 
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Table IV. Determinants of the Size of Derivatives Position 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Determinants	of	the	Size	of	Derivatives	Position
(1) (2)
VARIABLES ABS(Unrealized/Sales)x1000 ABS(GainLoss/Sales)x1000
Ln(Assets) 0.577*** 0.376**
(0.000) (0.028)
Percent	Independent -0.036** -0.033*
(0.020) (0.071)
Board	Size -0.075 -0.078
(0.395) (0.444)
CEO	Chair 0.135 0.124
(0.620) (0.672)
Leverage 2.940** 1.818*
(0.023) (0.057)
Number	of	Business	Segements -0.185** -0.292***
(0.017) (0.000)
E-Index 0.425** 0.512**
(0.044) (0.033)
Constant -0.865 -1.160
(0.500) (0.554)
Observations 13,512 10,447
Adjusted	R-squared 0.072 0.091
Robust	pval	in	parentheses
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
This table reports results of OLS regressions on the absolute value of the industry adjusted unrealized 
derivatives values scaled by total sales. All models include industry fixed effects.  The E-Index is the subset 
of the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) G-index that includes six of the strongest anti-takeover provisions 
as used in Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009). All other variables are as described in previous tables. 
Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm. The corresponding p-values are reported beneath each 
coefficient estimate. 
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Table V. Firm Value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Firm	Value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Ln(Q) Ln(Q) Ln(Q) Ln(Q)
Der.	Unrealized	Gains	(Losses)/Sales -0.495**
(0.036)
FD	Der.	Unrealized	Gains	(Losses)/Sales -0.286
(0.203)
Der.	Realized	Gain	(Loss)/Sales -0.227
(0.338)
FD	Der.	Realized	Gain	(Loss)/Sales -0.234*
(0.089)
Percent	Independent -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.000
(0.232) (0.777) (0.037) (0.435)
Outside	Director	Ownership -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO	Ownership -0.002 -0.002* -0.001 -0.001
(0.122) (0.095) (0.529) (0.405)
CEO	Ownership2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.785) (0.546) (0.855) (0.438)
Operating	Cash	Flow/Assets 1.201*** 1.156*** 1.159*** 1.064***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital	Expenditure/Sales 0.077** 0.063 0.084** 0.077*
(0.049) (0.114) (0.030) (0.076)
R&D/Assets 0.706*** 0.760*** 0.862*** 0.822**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.020)
Ln(Assets) -0.098*** -0.088*** -0.095*** -0.077***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln(Firm	Age) -0.026** -0.013 -0.056*** -0.024
(0.011) (0.239) (0.000) (0.140)
Number	of	Business	Segements -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 1.325*** 1.189*** 1.445*** 1.179***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 12,219 10,934 9,126 7,851
Adjusted	R-squared 0.723 0.732 0.746 0.754
Robust	pval	in	parentheses
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
This table reports results from OLS regressions using firm fixed effects of the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q. FD 
denotes first difference. Outside Director Ownership is the percentage of shares outstanding held by all of the 
non-employee directors on the board. Founding Family Present is an indicator variable that equals one if a 
founding family member is present on the board. Operating Cash Flow and Capital Expenditures are from 
Compustat. All other variables are as described in prior Tables. All models incorporate robust standard errors. 
The corresponding p-values are reported beneath each coefficient estimate. 
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Table VI. Change in Derivatives Exposure and Idiosyncratic Risk and the Likelihood of 
being an Acquisition Target. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel A: Proportion of Firms Targeted 
 
  
Δ Idiosyncratic Risk 
  
  
High Low Difference 
 ABS(Δ Der. Realized 
Gain (Loss)/Sales) 
High 0.136 0.122 0.014 p=0.341 
Low 0.196 0.155 0.040** p=0.024 
 
Difference -0.059*** -0.033** 
  
  
p=0.000 p=0.047 
   
 
 
Panel B: Tobins Q 
 
  
Δ Idiosyncratic Risk 
  
  
High Low Difference 
 ABS(Δ Der. Realized 
Gain (Loss)/Sales) 
High 1.594 1.759 -0.165*** p=0.000 
Low 1.699 1.669 0.030 p=0.538 
 
Difference -0.105** 0.090* 
  
  
p=0.011 p=0.075 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table reports results of differences in the proportion of firms that were targeted. All firm-years were split 
into terciles by the change in idiosyncratic risk and absolute value of the change in derivative realized 
gain/(loss) scaled by total sales. The middle terciles were eliminated and remaining observations placed into 
quadrants based on increasing and decreasing idiosyncratic risk and derivative gains(losses). The 
corresponding p-values are reported for the difference in the proportion of firms that were targeted across 
quadrants.  
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Table VII. Acquisition Target – Matched Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A 
 
 
 
Panel B 
 
 
Summary	Statistics
Covariates Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Ln(Assets) 7.619 7.485 7.600 7.458 0.019 0.027
Percent	Independent 75.609 77.778 75.324 77.778 0.284 0.000
Board	Size 9.107 9.000 9.065 9.000 0.043 0.000
CEO	Chair 0.546 1.000 0.554 1.000 -0.008 0.000
Leverage 0.313 0.308 0.319 0.307 -0.006* 0.001
Number	of	Business	Segements 2.756 2.000 2.709 2.000 0.048 0.000
E-Index 3.233 3.000 3.240 3.000 -0.006 0.000
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
DifferenceTreatment	Sample Control	Sample
Proportion	of
Firms	Targeted
Low	Derivative	Use 0.13
High	Derivative	Use 0.11
Difference 0.02***
P-Value (0.002)
This table reports results from a matched-pair design. Matches are identified according to the likelihood of 
having high derivative use by minimizing the difference in propensity score based on several control 
variables. Within each matched pair, treatment firms are those with higher derivative use while control firms 
are those with lower derivative use. Panel A presents the covariate balance between the matched pairs. Panel 
B presents a comparison of the proportion of the firms that were the target of an acquisition.  
